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 Imposing liability on a company for sexual harassment by supervisors cannot be
justified as promoting equality between the sexes, protection of workers, or protection of
the owners of the company.  Such liability might be justified to prevent breach of contract
or behavior offensive to the general public-- a "civility code".  The recent Supreme Court
ruling in Oncale that same-sex harassment is illegal can be justified on these grounds.  The
ruling  in Ellerth and Faragher concerning employer liability  for sexual harassment by
supervisors contrary to the employer’s interest  is less satisfactory because the Court’s rule
will  encourage litigation and defensive bureaucratic complexity.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
This article will look at the objectives of the law of sexual harassment, with special
attention to the issues raised by the 1998 Supreme Court decisions in Ellerth v.  Burlington,
1
Oncale v.  Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc,
2 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton.
3  I  will
suggest that the case law has little relation to the goal of preventing discrimination against
                                               
1 118 S Ct. 2257 (1998).
2 118 S Ct. 998 (1998).
3 118 S Ct 2275 (1998).2
women; that it has no basis in efficient employment law; that it can be better justified by its
effect on parties uninvolved in the employment relation; and that it makes sense to apply
traditional principles of agency law rather than strict liability or lack of positive efforts by
the principal to control intentional torts by agents.
 The   law of sexual harassment is relatively recent.
4 The main line of  federal cases
comes to us via the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1986 case of Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson.
5 In 1998, three major cases were decided by the U.S.  Supreme Court: Ellerth,
Faragher, and Oncale.  Meritor distinguishes the exchange of employment favors for
sexual favors, or "quid pro quo” sexual harassment, and rude behavior or language in the
workplace that has a sexual element, or "hostile environment” sexual harassment. The first
category might more accurately be termed "attempted solicitation of prostitution", and the
second, "lewd language and behavior." Neither requires the intent to offend or continuous
action that are key parts of harassment in the usual sense of the word.
6 Neither is special to
the workplace.  When a man offers money to a woman on a city street for sex,  that is
solicitation of prostitution, a definite quid pro quo offer; if he makes lewd remarks to a
group of ladies in the local mall he is  certainly creating  a hostile environment.
7. This
                                               
4 A number of areas of law pertain to sexual harassment. The common law applies via
contract and tort law. Since sexual harassment is a workplace offense, it can often be
viewed as breach of contract. Since it is an injury to a particular individual, it can be viewed
as a tort, under the heading of intentional infliction of emotional distress. State fair
employment statutes often apply. See Terry Dworkin, Laura Ginger & Jane Mallor,
Theories of Recovery for Sexual Harassment: Going Beyond Title VII, 25 San Diego L Rev
125 (1988). For a practical exposition of the law, see William Petrocelli and Barbara Repa,
Sexual Harassment on the Job (Nolo Press, 1998). A standard treatise is Barbara
Lindemann and Paul Grossman, Employment Discrimination Law (American Bar
Association,1996).
5 477 US 57 (1986).  A parallel law of sexual harassment is based on Title IX of the Civil
Rights Act, which provides that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. §
1681. The Supreme Court ruled in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 US 60
(1992) that a school can be liable for damages for sexual harassment  under Title IX.
6 One dictionary defines "harass" as:  “1: to worry and impede by repeated raids (harassed
the enemy) 2a: EXHAUST, FATIGUE b: to annoy persistently.” Webster’s Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary, First Digital Edition (Merriam-Webster, 1992).
7 Indiana Code § 35-45-4-3 (1998), “Patronizing a prostitute” says “A person who
knowingly or intentionally pays, or offers or agrees to pay, money or other property to
another person: (1) For having engaged in, or on the understanding that the other person
will engage in, sexual intercourse or deviate sexual conduct with the person or with any
other person; or (2) For having fondled, or on the understanding that the other person will
fondle, the genitals of the person or any other person; commits patronizing a prostitute, a
Class A misdemeanor. However, the offense is a Class D felony if the person has two (2)
prior convictions under this section.” The language seems to apply to quid pro quo sexual
harassment, but I have not heard of any arrests being made.3
article will examine   why and how law might be useful in reducing the amount of  both
kinds of workplace sexual harassment, with special discussion of the  U.S.  Supreme
Court’s 1998  decisions.
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAW
Title  VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that it is "an unlawful
employment practice for an employer .  .  .  to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."
8 Under Title VII, someone
who believes he has been discriminated against first goes to the United States Equal
Employment Opportunities Commission (the EEOC), which decides whether to pursue
litigation itself.   If it decides not to, the person who filed the claim may sue on his own
behalf in federal district court.
9  Until 1991, only lost wages could be recovered under a
Title VII claim, but in that year new legislation allowed recovery of compensatory and
punitive damages up to a limit varying from $50,000 to $300,000 depending on the size of
the company.
10  In addition, the court may award attorney’s fees.
11
  What constitutes actionable harm has evolved over the years.  The most important
case up until 1998 that dealt specifically with sexual harassment was Meritor. In that case
the plaintiff bank employee claimed that her supervisor had created a hostile environment
for her at her workplace by repeatedly demanding sexual favors, demands with which she
complied, and committing a variety of other harassing and indecent acts.   She did not report
his behavior to anyone higher up in the bank.  Some time after the problem had ceased and
when she was no longer employed there, she sued both the bank and the supervisor for
compensatory and punitive damages.  Meritor established that not just quid pro quo but also
hostile environment sexual harassment, involving intangible harm, was actionable.  The
Court also held that employers might be liable for sexual harassment by their supervisors
even if they are not informed of the harassment, and that "agency principles" should decide
whether the employer is liable for the misdeeds of his agent.
 Oncale, Ellerth, and Faragher attempted to clarify the ambiguities left by Meritor.
In Oncale, the plaintiff sued his employer, two supervisors, and a co-worker from his eight-
man offshore oil rig crew for offensive homosexual behavior, including physical assault.
After his complaints to the employer, Sundowner, were ignored, he quit, and sued, alleging
that he was discriminated against because of his sex.
12.  The U.S. Supreme Court held that
                                               
8  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
9  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5.
10 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a).
11  42 U.S.C. § 1988 (b).
12 Oncale resigned after taking a smoking break without permission and  becoming involved
in an argument with the harsassing supervisor, who reprimanded him and said he would
“run him off’.   For  graphic details of the case, see the Brief for the Respondents, Oncale v.4
Oncale was not barred from his suit merely because both he and the defendants were male,
though he would have to show that their behavior was "discrimination on the basis of sex".
In Ellerth, plaintiff sued her employer, Burlington, because her supervisor had made
offensive remarks and threats to her, although the threats had not been carried out.  She
never complained to Burlington, or used its sexual harassment grievance procedure.  She
quit Burlington, and then sued saying that Burlington had forced her constructive discharge.
In Faragher, plaintiff sued her employer, the City of Boca Raton, and supervisors alleging
that the supervisors had made offensive remarks and threats, although again the threats were
not carried out.  She was unaware of the city's sexual harassment policy, and did not notify
the City of the supervisors' behavior, though she did complain informally to another
supervisor.
 Ellerth and Faragher arose because Meritor had left it unclear when the employer
would be liable for harassment by supervisors if the victimized employee did not notify the
employer.  In the Seventh Circuit's en banc opinion in Ellerth, Judge Posner, in discussing
the use of the Restatement of Agency to determine when employers are liable for the torts
of the supervisors they hire, wrote that
It is time that we threw away the crutch of the Restatement and, recognizing the
differences between workplace sexual harassment and the actual subject matter of
that antiquated screed, ask as an original matter--as I think the Supreme Court
invited us to do in Meritor when it understated  that the common law of agency
might not be fully transferable to sexual harassment--what the best regime of
liability would be for these cases.
13
 The rule the U.S.  Supreme Court applied in both Ellerth and Faragher is as follows.
  An employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee.  When no tangible employment
action is taken, a defending employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or
damages, subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence, see Fed.  Rule Civ.
Proc.  8(c).  The defense comprises two necessary elements: (a) that the employer
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing
behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise. . . .  No affirmative defense is available, however, when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment action, such as
discharge, demotion, or undesirable reassignment.
14
                                                                                                                                               
Sundowner, 1996 U.S. Briefs 568. Note that Oncale’s allegation is not of mere horseplay,
but of genuine threats of homosexual assault; he said,  "I felt that if I didn't leave my job,
that I would be raped or forced to have sex."  ) Oncale, 118 S Ct. 998 (1998) at __, quoting
Oncale’s deposition).
13 Ellerth v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 123 F3d 490, 510 (7th Cir 1997) (en banc).
14 118 S Ct. at ___.5
 Thus, if a supervisor engages in quid pro quo harassment, the employer is strictly
liable.  If the supervisor creates a hostile environment, the regime is strict liability with a
limited defense of employee negligence.  The careful employer can escape liability if the
victimized employee did not take reasonable measures to report or avert the harm; the
careless employer is liable even if the employee was equally careless.
III.  THE OBJECTIVES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW.
A.  Sex Discrimination
The law has taken curious turns in reaching its present attitude towards sexual
harassment.  Judges are  stretching Title VII to cover wrongs that are not within the original
meaning of sex discrimination, in a way reminiscent of how in   Blackstone's day legal
fictions were used to wedge desirable policies into existing laws.  Blackstone notes how the
writ of Trespas was used to bring torts to the King's Bench, but the  trespassing allegation
was always then dropped, and the tort pursued.
15  Just so, we now hang sexual harassment
onto the writ of Title VII.  Blackstone’s  Gothic castle of the law  has its advantages, but we
would do well in the present day  to develop a principled basis for sexual harassment law.
Sexual harassment law  is, on its face,   a way to fight sex discrimination, and in
some cases sex discrimination  indeed is involved.   A clear example  would be  if   an
employer encouraged g male workers  to engage  in aggressive sexual banter and horseplay
to drive female workers to quit.
This was not the problem in Oncale, Ellerth, or Faragher, however. Rather, the
connection with Title VII and sex discrimination in those cases is that a certain   employee
is subject to offensive behavior to which a  member of the opposite sex  would not have
been subject.
16   Under this logic, if a bisexual supervisor terrorized both male and female
employees with demands for sex, the law should hold that behavior harmless.
17
                                               
15 “For this accusation of trespass it is, that gives the court of king’s bench jurisdiction in
other civil causes, as was formerly observed; since, when once the defendant is taken into
custody of the marshall, or prison-keeper of this court, for the supposed trespass, he, being
then a prisoner of this court, may here be prosecuted for any other species of injury. Yet, in
order to found this jurisdiction, it is not necessary that the defendant be actually the
marshall’s prisoner; for, as soon as he appears, or puts in bail to the process, he is deemed
by so doing to be in such custody of the marshall, as will give the court a jurisdiction to
proceed.” William Blackstone, Commentaries. Book 3: Of Private Wrongs, Chapter 19: Of
Process.
16  Justice Thomas’s  one-sentence concurrence in Oncale  emphasizes that this is the legal
principle applied even there:   “ I concur because the Court stresses that in every sexual
harassment case, the plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's statutory6
Even in these cases, however, the employee’s sex is not the only, or even the
primary, reason for victimization.  Usually the harasser only harasses beautiful women. If a
man supervises 100 men and 100 women, and harasses the one woman with red hair, it is
peculiar to say that he is discriminating on the basis of sex rather than hair color. The
motive is sexual desire for an individual, not an attitude towards a class of people. This
kind of victimization would continue even if supervisors were bisexual,  or  if we were a
race of intelligent flatworms having  only one sex but propagating sexually.
18    Although
there may be good reason to object to a practice that allocates benefits to attractive, immoral
people rather than than unattractive moral people,
19this is not   discrimination on the basis
of sex.
20Moreover, even to the extent that harassment discriminates on the basis of sex, it is
not clear that it discriminates against women as a class.  If a male supervisor only gives
promotions in return for sexual favors from female employees, male employee are at a clear
disadvantage.
To be sure, this is not the case if the offer of promotion for sex would cause
unhappiness to most women, or if supervisors use their power as a  stick rather than a
carrot, threatening demotion rather than promising promotion to the attractive employees.
The supervisor’s incentives, however, give reason to believe  that he will use the carrot
more often than the stick.
First, as will be discussed further below, employment is voluntary, and if an
employer wants the employee to provide more of anything, whether it be hours of work,
unpleasant conditions, or  sexual favors, the employer must give up something  to obtain the
                                                                                                                                               
requirement that there be discrimination "because of  sex."’ Oncale, 118 S Ct. 998 (1998) at
__.
17 One court, at least, has suggested this is the case. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F2d 983, 990
(DC Cir 1977).
18 Sexual reproduction does not require more than one sex.  It means that two individuals
each contribute half of the genes to the offspring, as opposed to asexual reproduction, in
which the one parent contributes all of the genes. Both amebas and flatworms (planaria)
have just one sex, but  flatworms reproduce sexually. See Ralph Buchsbaum, Animals
Without Backbones   (2
nd  ed., 1948) at  19, 115.  Differences  in  attractiveness between
individuals are intrinsic to sexual reproduction, because  the value of the genes to be
contributed to the  joint offspring differ in value.
19 For a careful analysis of the allocational effects of sexual liasons at work, see Gertrude
Fremling and Richard Posner, Status Signaling and the Law, with Particular Application to
Sexual Harassment, unpublished manuscript,July 11, 1998 (Status Signalling).
 
20 Nevertheless, a court has found discrimination in such circumstances. Toscano v.
Nimmo, 570 F Supp 1197 (1983) (holding in favor of women who alleged that although she
was not asked for sexual favors the woman who was promoted in competition with her
succeeded because she did grant them to the supervisor).   Whether because of quid pro
quo's or for other reasons,   attractive people, both men and women, do better in the
workplace. See Daniel  Hamermesh and Jeff Biddle, Beauty and the Labor Market,  84 Am.
Ec. Rev.  1174 (1994).7
extra employee effort.   This is most obvious if the harassment takes the form of offering to
hire someone only if they will provide sexual favors;  an employer cannot threaten someone
who is not yet his employee.
21
  Second,  sexual harassment is most often a concern when the employer has hired a
supervisor to oversee the employee, and the supervisor takes advantage of his position to
harass the employee.  This, too, will be discussed in more detail below, but  it has one
implication that is relevant immediately:  the supervisor has more reason to  try to obtain
sexual favors with promises   than with threats.
   Ordinarily, the employer who hires both supervisor and employee loses if the
supervisor reduces the efficiency of the company by promoting employees in return for
personal favors Such promotions puts the wrong people in the wrong positions and also
reduces  all employees’ incentives to work hard.  In order to avoid  punishment, the
supervisor  will try to hide his quest for sexual favors.  If he demotes a woman for not
acceding to his wishes, questions will be asked about why, and she has a strong incentive to
bring the reason to the employer’s attention.  If the supervisor fails to promote someone
who would otherwise have been promoted, the anomaly is equally apparent.  If, however, he
promotes a woman who is unqualified, she will not complain to anyone, and his
misbehavior may well go unnoticed.  Moreover, if a woman undeserving of promotion
rejects his offer, and he fails to promote her, she has no case to make against him.  The
company will not care that he has not promoted her, and he can deny that he ever made the
offer.  In light of these advantages of the carrot over the stick, we should expect that quid
pro quo sexual harassment helps women more than it hurts them.   Since the focus of
attention has been on the sexual harassment of women, this suggests that the public is
worried about some harm other than sex discrimination.
22
Hostile environment harassment also may not clearly be sex discrimination if the
harasser persecutes both male and female employees in different ways.   It may be
discrimination where a workplace is made inhospitable to women precisely because they are
women, in the hopes of driving them out or for the pleasure of tormenting them, and where
                                               
21 The employer can, of course, threaten not to hire the person.   This, however, leaves the
person no worse off than if the  employer did not exist in the first place.  Using the word
"threat" there is like using it to say that the employer threatens not to pay the person unless
they agree to work for him; the threat is just to withhold benefits, not to inflict harm.  We do
not regard a woman  as being hurt if someone comes up to  her  and offers to pay  her  a
thousand dollars if--but only if-- she  will  wash his car, threatening not to pay  her if  she
refuses.  The situation here is analogous.
22 I have overstated the case here. The supervisor does have some power to secretly punish,
because he has certain private knowledge about the employee's ability, and he can lie about
that knowledge. He can, for example, say in an annual personnel report that his private
opinion, based on what he has observed, is that the employee is less talented than would
appear to outsiders.  Sticks of this kind, however, are limited to private information,
whereas the carrots of undeserved privilege and promotion can more safely be used when
information is public.8
men are not subject to torment.  But, as discussed in Section C  below, this may involve a
different problem from discrimination that takes the form of hiring women in order to use
company resources to gain sexual favors.
  Whether Title VII is correctly applied to the evils of sexual harassment or not, it is
still useful to ask what other objectives sexual harassment law might be addressing.  As
discussed in the following sections, these include employee protection, employer protection,
and public morality.
 B.  Efficient Labor Law: Protecting Employees.
Alternatively, sexual harassment law might  be useful as a way to protect employees
who are hurt by supervisors. The problem is that, like other working conditions, sexual
harassment can be negotiated between employer and employee.  If the harm is internalized
in the employment relation, there is no market failure, and no need for the government to
mandate a particular punishment scheme. Indeed, government-imposed liability might even
lead to worse consequences for both parties.
 Let us start by examining the effect on the employee of sexual harassment law
when the employer, or an agent acting pursuant to the employer's instruction, harasses the
employee, as distinguished from harassment by a supervisor acting solely in his own
interest.
 First, consider quid pro quo harassment.  A pay raise in exchange for sexual favors
is simply payment for services and no less efficient than when the employer gives a pay
raise to the employee who tells the best jokes.  It is the employer's money, and he is not
bound to use it as a reward for hard work or intelligence.  Similarly, if the employer wants
to fire an employee for not providing sexual favors, that is no different from firing the
employee for not agreeing to work harder for the same pay.  As long as the firing does not
violate the employment contract-- an obvious exception,   which has long given the victim
recourse to contract law for remedies-- the firing  is not unfair or inefficient.
Suppose a clerk can command a wage of $40,000 per year in the labor market, and
can produce clerical services worth $30,000 to the employer.  The employer could choose
not to hire her, which is the efficient outcome if he cares only about maximizing profits.  If
her sexual favors, or talent for laughing at  unfunny jokes, however, is worth 10,000 dollars
or more to the employer but has opportunity costs of less than that to the employee, she may
choose to work for the  unfunny and lascivious employer.  More likely, she will demand a
pay premium for these activities, and we may observe her choosing to work for him at a
wage of $45,000 instead.  In any case, the terms of employment can be negotiated between
worker and employer, who have a far better idea than the government of how much they
value these things.9
Hostile environment harassment can be analyzed in the same way.  Many workplace
environments are unpleasant for a variety of reasons. Often the unpleasantness is
unavoidable because of the external environment, such as staffing the Alaska post offices or
because of other employees' obnoxiousness.
23 But nobody is forced to work in Alaska or
with the obnoxious. Employers who wish to maintain unpleasant environments  therefore
must pay a wage premium.  Both employer and employee will rationally make the decision
of how to trade off money against working in or trying to improve the unpleasant working
conditions.
Now consider an employer who is known for making crude jokes and offensive
remarks to women and prefers to hire women.  The market wage for a secretary is
$20,000.  He, however, is willing to pay up to $10,000 extra to be able to be offensive to a
woman.  If he offers a wage of $28,000, the job will be taken and kept by some woman for
whom the extra $8,000 is worth the unpleasantness. Both employer and secretary are better
off than if he did not hire her.  Even if the secretary would not say that she enjoys her work,
or likes it that her boss is offensive, she does like the package as a whole.   If the law
allowed secretaries to sue offensive employers, the employer would behave himself.
Knowing he would have to behave himself, however, he would only offer the market wage
of  $20,000.  The secretary would prefer $30,000 and the offensive remarks, but the law
prevents her from getting that deal.  The law ends up hurting the very person it was intended
to protect.
24
It is not uncommon for regulation to hurt the people it purports to protect.  High
standards for housing quality, for example, notoriously result in the disappearance of cheap
housing, and, indeed, could not do otherwise.
25 The justification for such regulation has to
be found outside of the benefit to the supposed beneficiaries, those who are prevented from
buying low-cost, low-quality housing.    In the case of housing, one such external benefit
might be that fewer cheap and unattractive buildings are built, making the city more
                                               
23 It is sometimes observed that a university department has far more than its share of
unpleasant faculty. This may be a rational response to unfortunate initial conditions-- if the
department's social atmosphere is poisonous to begin with, that department loses far less by
hiring an obnoxious new professor than another department which starts with cordial and
civilized relations among its faculty.
24 Moreover, employer and employee cannot get around the problem by a written waiver of
the employee’s right to sue. Such an ex ante waiver of a Title VII right is void.  See
Fremling and  Posner, Status Signaling, note  19   at 25.
25 See, for example, Christopher Jencks, The Homeless (Harv. U. Press, 1994).  One small
example illustrates the point. The City of Bloomington requires that any bedroom shared by
three or more people must be at least 200 square feet. A graduate student with a wife and
two children was therefore evicted from his one-bedroom apartment, his appeal to stay
being unanimously rejected by the Board of Housing Quality Appeals. One local property
manager said this case was “cut and dry” and “To me, it’s something I deal with every day,
and I’m very cognizant of certain ordinances regarding family size and regarding square
footage.” Family’s Request to Extend Lease is Denied, Bloomington Herald-Times, May
16, 1998, p. A1. Www.hoosiertimes.com.10
attractive for richer people. We will see that a similar argument  can be made for
harassment laws.
Assuming a labor market where all employees are paid the market wage, any loss
from sexual harassment will be borne entirely by the employer, not the employee.  Any
employer who tries to offer a worse deal than the market wage will find himself with no
employees.  An employer who offers the usual  wage with a hostile environment will not
retain any workers.
 If we do not assume a competitive labor market, the argument still holds, but with a
variant.  Suppose that for some reason  only one employer exists for whom a woman wishes
to work.    Since she is not  a slave, however, she does still have the option not to work at
all.  This means that if the job is unattractive enough, she will still refuse it.  In the extreme,
if the job requires her to commit suicide in a painful way, she will reject it even if the
alternative is unemployment with starvation.  More realistically, when people say that a
woman has no alternative but to work for a particular employer, they mean that  switching
would require a large pay cut,  or would  require her to take an entirely different kind of job.
Suppose that  Anne  is a computer programmer   generating $100,000  per year in profits for
her employer, and that because her skills are highly specialized to the software her
employer uses,  her next best alternative job is to work in a fast food restaurant earning
$15,000 per year.  Suppose also that except for the pay, she is indifferent between the two
jobs.   In a competitive labor market, she would earn $100,000, but since her skills are firm-
specific,    the employer  can get away with paying her much less.  If we assume that she
has no bargaining power, in fact, the employer will pay her   a mere $15,001 for her
computer programming-- just enough to keep her from quitting.   But now suppose that the
employer wants to subject her to obnoxious jokes,  so obnoxious that an accurate   estimate
of the damage to her would be $1,000.    He cannot continue to pay her just $15,001, or she
will quit. He must pay her $16,001 to compensate for the unpleasant working conditions.
More generally, lack of bargaining power does not alter the fact that an employer who
wishes to provide worse working conditions must provide a higher salary. The employer
will use his strong bargaining power to reduce the salary as much as possible in any case,
but he will not be able to keep the salary as low if he wants to provide poor working
conditions as well.
Harassment may, of course, be a breach of contract. Indeed, if sexual harassment is
unusual, its absence may be considered an implicit term in employment contracts.
Harassment may, then, give rise to a claim for breach of contract. Suppose, for example,
that Jane agrees to work for Richard with the understanding that the job has normal working
conditions and will last for at least two years.  She spends $5,000 to move from Chicago to
Seattle for the job.  Richard harasses her enough that she finds the salary inadequate and
quits.  If Jane is not compensated for her $5,000, wealth will not be maximized.  She may
have had offers in Chicago that were almost as lucrative as the Seattle job, and which she
would have accepted had Richard been clear about the terms of employment.  The $5,000
she spent is a social waste. But this is no different from other types of breach, such as the
employee's failure to work as hard as promised or the employer's failure to provide a job as
attractive as promised.11
Apart from her remedy for breach, the employee may simply be able to leave and
look for another job. If an employee and employer only care about the short term, then any
disappointment in the conditions of work will have limited effect. The wage can be
renegotiated for the next day, at a rate appropriate to the unpleasantness of the work. But
this is a problem if workers cannot easily switch jobs once they discover that their
employment environment is not as pleasant as they expected. 
26
Thus, if sexual harassment is a problem, it is not because of the actions themselves,
but because the employer harasses the employee without providing bargained-for
compensation.  Employers make employees do many unpleasant things, but that is why they
call it “work” and pay people for it.  It is not the unusual job, but the typical one, which is
unpleasant enough that people would not do it unless they were paid.
Even if the employer does provide adequate compensation, however,  so that  both
employer and employee were satisfied, it may be that  many  people outside the relationship
would still object to both quid pro quo and hostile environment harassment.   Even
understanding that the employee  freely consented,  and even believing that the employee
personally  derives greater satisfaction from  the extra pay than dissatisfaction from the
extra  duties,  these  observers would wish to prohibit the relationship.  It is important to
understand, though,   that protection of the employee is a weak basis for sexual harassment
law,  inconsistent with rationality of  employers and employees even when  labor markets
are imperfect.
C.  Efficient Agency Law: Protecting the Employer
We have so far  limited  ourselves to  situations in which the harassment  is  by or at
the direction of the employer.  What if the harassment is by a supervisor who is acting
against the employer’s interest?    Do we need laws to protect the employer?
Law is indeed necessary here,  but to allow the employer and employee alike  to
obtain redress from the supervisor, not to allow the employee to sue the employer.   . We
certainly cannot protect the employer against the misdeeds of the supervisor by making the
employer liable for those misdeeds.  There is reason, however, to make the supervisor liable
for harm, since he might otherwise obtain the benefit from harassment without bearing the
cost.
                                               
26   The employer is also vulnerable to disappointment in the abilities and effort of the
employee. Under employment at will,  employer and employee both agree to accept the
risk of incurring reliance expenditures and then being disappointed, since the contract can
be terminated by either party at any time.12
Assume the same hypothetical as in the previous section.  A clerk can provide
clerical services worth $20,000 to the employer of the company, but she is hired by the
supervisor for $28,000 because she agrees to provide sexual services to him.  Both the clerk
and the supervisor are happy with this arrangement, but we now must ask whether it is still
efficient, given that the employer pays the bill.  It may be that the employer agreed to pay
the supervisor $95,000 per year for supervisory services worth an expected $100,000.  In
that case, the employer would not have hired this supervisor if he had foreseen that the
supervisor would expend an extra $8,000 for sexual perks. On the other hand, the employer
might have agreed to pay the supervisor just $70,000 and to give him a fund of $25,000
with which to pay above-market wages for employees if he wishes to for any reason.  In that
case, the sexual (or other) perks are part of the arrangement and the outcome is efficient.
27
Whether the supervisor asks for straight cash or for some nonpecuniary work benefit that is
costly to the employer should not matter if both parties agree.    The employer  does not
need sexual harassment law to protect it from authorized supervisor behavior, even if that
behavior, considered  in isolation,  hurts the  employer.  The problem comes with supervisor
actions that are costly to and unauthorized by the employer.   If, unknown to the employer,
the supervisor harasses   employees, making the environment unpleasant and requiring  the
employees to be paid more or to be lost to the company, this is inefficient. It is just as if the
supervisor were to demand monetary kickbacks from the employees, on top of his
authorized  salary.
  Agency law  and criminal  law  may both be  helpful to  employers whose
supervisors misbehave.   Agency law allows the employer to sue the supervisor for
damages. 
28 Criminal law allows the employer to bring a complaint to the prosecutor, who
may then prosecute and imprison the supervisor for particularly egregious kinds of
misbehavior. If the sexual harassment rises to the level of rape,  assault,  or indecent
exposure,  the supervisor would  be subject to criminal penalties. With regard to sexual
harassment in particular,   I do not know of any cases of employers suing supervisors, but it
would be no different in principle from suing for other kinds of harm.
If, as in Ellerth and Faragher, a supervisor harasses an employee, the employer as
well as the employee can lose from lost employee productivity, under-promotion of the
qualified, overpromotion of the unqualified, and recruiting and training costs to replace
employees who quit or are fired.  Assume, for example, that Supervisor Sam harasses
employee Emily every day with hostile sexual comments. After six months, Emily quits.
The employer must pay $2,000 to train a new employee, and Emily incurs $1,000 in costs to
find a new job. Who should bear these costs?
Punishing supervisor Sam-- the only party who benefits from the harm if losses lie
where they fall-- is the obvious and efficient solution.     Sanctions against supervisors are
                                               
27 This argument may also be found in the short discussion of sexual harassment in Richard
Posner, An Economic Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U Chi L Rev 1311, 1332,
where, however, Judge Posner expresses skepticism that the reduction in supervisor wages
would really outweigh the increase in employee wages and the reduction in productivity.
28 See Restatement of Agency (Second), @ 399, quoted below.13
especially effective compared to sanctions against agents generally, because supervisors
have more to lose.    By virtue of their higher positions, they are less likely to be judgment-
proof and  more likely to care about being fired ,  about social sanctions, and about criminal
penalties.  All of these remedies will be discussed below in a later section.
Protection of the employer does not justify making the employer himself liable for
unauthorized harassment by the supervisor.   The following argument can be made   for why
such liability could benefit  the employer, but after stating the argument, I will show why it
is fallacious:
"The employer is hurt by  the supervisor's  sexual harassment, just as the
employee is.  Especially in the case of quid pro quo sexual harassment, however,
the employer may not be able to discover the supervisor's bad behavior except at
great cost. The employer would therefore like   the employees to have an  incentive
to  bring  the supervisor's behavior to the company's attention.   Employer liability
provides this incentive.  If the employer can be sued for the supervisor's sexual
harassment, this will help the employer in two ways. First, it will give the employer
more incentive to monitor the supervisor. Second, the employees will help the
company  monitor the supervisor, by bringing suit.    Moreover, with this extra
monitoring, the amount of sexual harassment will decline, and so  the potential
liability of the employer may in the end not result in many lawsuits anyway."
 This argument  is flawed.  First, the employer does not need legal liability to give
the employees incentive to bring harassment to its attention.  The employer can voluntarily
offer rewards equivalent to the  potential damages from lawsuits-- and employer and
employee alike  can avoid  trial costs and legal fees, a substantial benefit.  Second,  the
company can also voluntarily increase the amount of monitoring it does even if it has no
legal liability,  and with such liability the amount of monitoring will be inefficiently great.
There is such a thing as too much employer time, money, and attention being spent
combatting sexual harassment.
One way to see this last point is by analogy to bribery of purchasing agents.
Suppose that Supplier A might  bribe  an employer's purchasing agent to buy  inferior
products, at a cost of $10,000 to the employer.    The employer opposes this, of course, and
would devote up to $10,000 in extra monitoring to prevent this, spending the money on
more elaborate  accounting, extra paperwork, redundant approvals, and suchlike.  Moreover,
the employer would like it if other suppliers competing with Supplier A would help inform
the employer of the bribery, and might offer  implicit or explicit rewards for such
information.   If  a proposal is made to now let other suppliers sue the employer  for $6,000
when the purchasing agent unjustly awards a contract to Supplier A, will this increase
efficiency and benefit the employer? No.     The frequency of bribery will indeed fall.   The
employer will discover it more often, because it will be sued by suppliers more often. The
employer will also increase its expenditures to combat bribery, spending up to $16,000 to
prevent  it. But spending that much to fight bribery is inefficient; one ought not to spend
$16,000 to prevent $10,000 in damage, and despite the fact that damage falls, the overall
result is undesirable.14
 In the same way, increased employer liability for sexual harassment will induce the
employer to take more precautions, and will reduce the amount of sexual harassment, but
this is not necessarily desirable, because both lawsuits and extra precautions have extra
costs. If they did not,  optimal policy would be clear:  impose legal liability for sexual
harassment, but make the damage award equal to the entire value of the company, perhaps
adding jail terms for all shareholders.    This reductio ad absurdum would surely reduce the
amount of sexual harassment, as employers strained to devote every resource to preventing
it, and the amount of sexual harassment would become negligible.  But this is clearly
undesirable.
It is   true  that the public might wish to reduce the amount of sexual harassment
even if that reduced the profit of the employer as well as the satisfaction of the employee. In
the same way, in fact,  the public might wish to reduce the amount of bribery more than the
employer does,   simply   to increase society's rewards to virtue   and reduce its rewards for
sin.   But  that is a different argument from protecting the employer, and must be dealt with
in  a later section.
E.  Sexual Harassment Law as a Civility Code.
The employer, supervisor, and employees are not the only people interested in
sexual harassment.  People care about what other people are doing even when the behavior
is consensual.  Many would rather not live in a society in which John sells heroin to Mary,
or Mary sells her body to John, or John provides Mary with hugs in exchange for being
allowed to beat her.  This kind of conduct may increase the joint wealth of the immediate
parties  but if it offends other people, it    imposes a negative  "mental externality."   This is
the economic justification for social regulation of many kinds.  The idea of economic
efficiency takes tastes as given-- they are simply preferences about the state of the world.
A person's tastes, including  his moral beliefs about other people's behavior, enter into
wealth maximization just as surely as do his consumption preferences.    A person's
strongest preferences are ordinarily about his own behavior rather than those of other
people.  Richard cares more about the flavor of ice cream that he eats himself than about the
flavor that David eats.  To the extent that Richard cares about what David does, however, as
measured in his willingness to pay to affect what David does, economic efficiency treats
Richard's preferences about David's actions  the same as David's.
29    The presence of
externalities does not necessarily imply that regulation will increase efficiency-- the
                                               
 
29 This is merely an application of the standard economic idea of an externality, e.g.
"When the actions of one  agent affect the environment of another agent other than by
affecting prices, we will say that there is an externality," Hal Varian, Microeconomic
Analysis, 1st Edition (1978) at 203 (italics as in the original).  For further elaboration, see
Eric Rasmusen,  Of Sex and Drugs and Rock'n Roll: Law and Economics and Social
Regulation, 21 Harv. J. L. & Public Policy  : 71-81 (1997); Eric Rasmusen, The Economics
of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities,  27 J. Leg.  Stud.  245-270 (1998).15
magnitude of the preferences determines that-- but it  disrupts the argument for the
efficiency of laissez faire.
Although an externality justification for government intervention may be based on
tastes, that does not necessarily excuse every government regulation.  Consider, for
example, such government interventions as insider trading laws and occupational licensing.
These cannot be justified on the basis of mental externalities, because nobody seriously
pretends that the public would be bothered by the fact that some people trade  stocks using
private information unless that somehow affected prices and hurt other people, or that some
people are barbers without having passed certifying examinations although they are just as
competent as other barbers.
30     Such regulations as those must stand or fall on other
arguments.
Nor is the mental externality argument a positive description of policy making such
as one finds in public choice theories.  Its justification is normative: that to maximize
societal wealth, or to achieve efficiency, people’s tastes regarding the behavior of other
people need to be taken into account.  Public choice theory and mental  externalities
interrelate to the extent that political decisions will tend to efficiency, since people will vote
their tastes.   On the other hand, the greatest beneficiaries of Title VII are plaintiffs’
attorneys, who would expend considerable political effort to retain or expand the current
law of sexual harassment, and the imperfections of the political system may give them
undue weight.   Normatively, however,  a given person really thinks that efficiency is a
social objective,  the presence of mental externalities  should make him ask whether
regulation might not be justified.
The idea of externalities applies easily to sexual harassment.    Most of us find
sexual harassment objectionable even if the parties involved are consenting.   Even someone
                                               
30 Insider trading, at least, is often discussed in terms of morality, but in terms of absolute
morality rather than  the preferences of the people in society. David Bayne, for instance, has
written extensively on  the duty of the insider not to hurt those with whom he trades, but the
basis for the argument is not that an insider who hurts people is offensive; even if everyone
else in society wickedly enjoyed the insider's treatment of others,  the insider's duty would
remain unaltered. David Bayne, Insider Trading: The Essence of the Insider’s Duty,  41
Kansas L. Rev. 315 (1992).    Similarly,  Anthony Kronman  notes that his approach to the
duty of lawyers to conduct themselves responsibly is not based on the cost-benefit
calculations of economists, even though the conclusions of the two approaches are often
identical. Anthony Kronman,  The Fault in Legal Ethics, 100 Dickinson L. Rev. 489 (1996).
Still another example of policy recommendations based on morality, but on morality
independent of  the utilitarian calculus of externalities is   the recent book by Geisler and
Turek on moral regulation of activities such as homosexuality and abortion. Norman Geisler
and Frank Turek, Legislating Morality,  (Bethany House, 1998).   Traditional morality is not
based on what  people want, but on what people ought to do.  Often, however,  arguments
from morality will reach policy  results similar to those from mental externalities, since if  a
large number of people strongly hold certain moral beliefs, the mental externalities
generated will justify social rules satisfying their preferences.16
with no direct connection to the company is   at last mildly displeased on hearing that
someone has been  promoted not for merit, but for sleeping with  the boss.  This might be
because the observer feels sympathy for other employees who were not promoted, or it
might be simply that the observer thinks the behavior is immoral.  Both reasons are quite
independent of the satisfaction of the boss and the promoted employee and of the financial
well-being of the company.    Moreover, the sexual element in the offense plays a part in the
moral outrage, even if the dollar impact of the offense is the same as for some behavior not
involving sex.  People dislike bribery of purchasing agents, but they do not become as
worked up about  it as they do  about  quid pro quo sexual harassment.   People seem to care
very little about other people being in safe but unpleasant working environments with
unpleasant bosses or unfriendly co-employees, but someone else working in an environment
of sexual    harassment  arouses more  sympathy.
We need not explain here why sexual behavior arouses strong feelings, but if it does,
then an externality is present that  requires regulation if the efficient outcome-- considering
all people in society, not just the employer and employee--  is to be attained.    Most people
would rather live in a society in which it does not occur, and would be willing to pay
something to obtain that society.  This is true even if they personally would like to engage
in sexual harassment, or would be willing to accept harassment if paid enough.  As with
burglary or the income tax, my ideal society is  one in which I am allowed to do anything I
like, while everyone else is restricted.  I may, however, prefer to prohibit everyone,
including myself, from engaging in the bad behavior, rather than  allowing everyone to
engage in it.  Thus, while individual citizens might find criminal or civil laws against sexual
harassment annoying or constricting in their own lives, they might nonetheless rationally
support such laws for society as a whole.
This reasoning does, of course, make sexual harassment law into a civility code,
exactly what Justice Scalia said it was not in Oncale:
"Respondents and their amici contend that recognizing liability for same-sex
harassment will transform Title VII into a general civility code for the American
workplace.  But that risk is no greater for same-sex than for opposite sex
harassment, and is adequately met by careful attention to the requirements of the
statute.''
31
It is, to be sure,  difficult to extract a civility code from the intent or plain language
of Title VII,  but from an  efficiency  point of view, civility is a legitimate motive for a law
of sexual harassment.   Just as public nudity is outlawed because it is displeasing to many
people, so is sexual harassment.   The  reasoning is, of course, independent of whether
sexual harassment occurs in the workplace or outside of it.  Indeed, if offensiveness to the
public is the grounds for punishing harassment, it ought to be punished more if it occurs in a
public space rather than in the workplace, and we should see judges extending Title VII to
courthouse squares and shopping malls.   But we already have statutes prohibiting
prostitution and its solicitation, which is analytically very similar to some forms of quid pro
                                               
31 Oncale, 118 S Ct at ___ (1998).17
quo sexual harassment-- the employer's offering a promotion for sexual favors is identical to
offering cash for sexual favors.  We also have civility codes suitable for hostile environment
harassment--  ,flashing, for example, has been long been banned outside the workplace, and
anti-stalking laws are a   example of a more recent innovations in civility regulation.
32 More
generally, the police have vaguely worded statutes at their disposal for the kind of behavior
that sexual harassment law covers in the workplace.
33
The civility code idea explains sexual harassment law better than other rationales.
Even if sexual harassment is a victimless crime as far as employer, employee, and
supervisor are concerned, the public loses from it. The civility code idea can explain the
1991 amendments, which allowed compensatory and punitive damages, but only up to a cap
of from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on the firm.
34  Limiting the compensatory damages
and allowing punitive damages make the legal damages more like a fine in an amount that
reflects the harm to the public. 
35
The civility justification also  explains why sexual behavior, not sexual
discrimination, is the heart of sexual harassment law, something odd in view of the
doctrine's formal legal justification.
36   As I discussed above, if  discrimination were really
the concern,  men should be bringing the quid pro quo lawsuits, and cases like Oncale
would arouse no public sympathy. That sexual behavior has captured so much attention
suggests that what offends the public is not the discrimination, but the  sex.    Thus, Mr.
Oncale wins his case against his offensive co-workers not because they dislike men or
because they discriminated against him as a man, but because they were disgusting and
rude.
                                               
32 In Indiana, for example, stalking is defined as “a knowing or an intentional course of
conduct involving repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a
reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and that actually
causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened” and is a Class D
felony. Indiana Code § 35-45-10-1, 5 (1998).
33 An example of a vaguely worded statute is the crime of “Intimidation”: “A person who
communicates a threat to another person, with the intent that: (1) The other person engage
in conduct against his will; or (2) The other person be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior
lawful act;  commits intimidation, a Class A misdemeanor.” Indiana Code § 35-45-2-1
(1998).
34 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a).
35 We will return to this below in the discussion of penalties for sexual harassment.
36 The neglect of discrimination in favor of attention to sex is the theme of Vicki Schultz,
Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 Yale L J 1683 (1998).18
III. Designing a Policy to  Appropriately Deter Sexual Harassment
A. Categories of Penalties
Five ways to deal with harassment are criminal punishment, property-rule protection,
liability-rule protection, social norms, and self-help.
37  I will briefly describe each,
providing an example of how the law might use the method  to deal with an employer who
persistently subjects a female employee to unwanted touching.
(1)Criminal punishment is  characterized by public prosecution in the courts  and the
possibility of  either monetary or non-monetary punishment,  with any fines going to the
government.   Example:  the county prosecutor prosecutes the employer for battery, asking
the court to jail the employer.
 (2) Property-rule protection  or   injunctive relief  is  characterized by private suit  in the
courts to obtain the remedy of a judicial command to cease the objectionable behavior, on
pain of imprisonment.  Example:  the woman is given the statutory right to ask a civil court
for an injunction requiring the employer to cease the touching. If he persists, she can ask the
court to rule him in contempt.
(3) Liability-rule protection or money damages is  characterized by private suit  in the
courts to obtain the remedy of  money damages for the victim.    Example: the employee is
given the statutory right to ask a civil court for money damages equal to the harm inflicted
upon her.
(4) Social norms    are   a private remedy  in which the  courts are not involved,    the victim
does not obtain compensation, and the perpetrator's  punishment is   inflicted by  those
people  with whom he  interacts either economically or socially.  Example: the employee
tells everyone she knows about the unwanted touching, and the employer finds that he and
his wife are no longer invited to other people's houses for dinner.
(5) Self-help  is a  private remedy  in which the punishment is  an act, otherwise illegal,
carried out by the victim with the acquiescence of the courts.    The employee slaps the
employer after one incident of harassment,  and quits in violation of her contract, but is
allowed to raise the employer's harassment as  a defense when he tries to use criminal
prosecution and civil suit for money damages  against her.
Each of these has its own advantages and disadvantages.   Criminal punishment is
prosecuted by the public prosecutor, and the prosecutorial discretion this introduces is good
                                               
37 See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L Rev 1089 (1972). Criminal
punishment, social norms, and self-help are not in their taxonomy, perhaps because they
offer no compensation to the victim of illegal behavior except revenge.19
if it prevents punishment of acts that are not harmful even if they are technical violation of
the law, but bad if it
Section II argued that the three  best rationales for laws against sexual harassment
are that harassment violates implicit terms of the employment contract, that  if done by a
supervisor without authorization by the employer it is similar to theft, and  that it offends
the sensibilities of the general public.
 The first rationale  is essentially breach of contract.     Breach of contract affects
only the parties to the contract, and does not have externalities on the outside world.   Thus,
the victim can be trusted to undertake  efficient actions to initiate  corrective action if the
remedy is money damages or an injunction to cease the harassment.   Injunctions  to the
employer to cease persistent minor irritation, however, are difficult to enforce, and while an
injunction to change employment status--  for example, to grant a promotion-- is simple
enough,  it is hard for a court to monitor  retaliation by the employer in such a complex
relationship as employment.  Money damages therefore seem appropriate if resort is to be
had to   courts.  These compensate the victim, unlike criminal penalties  and  do not require
public resources for prosecution.
Judgment-proofness of the tortfeasor  is a common  drawback of  money damages.
Judgement-proofnesss  reduces the deterrence effect of civil liability, although for
deterrence it may be enough that the defendant is reduced to penury.  More important,  the
defendant’s inability to pay removes the plaintiffs’ incentive to sue. 
38  The  problem is
less severe for sexual harassment torts than      for many other torts, however.   Employers
usually have ample resources, and  even supervisors are likely to  be wealthier than the
average person, not just because of a higher salary but because they are  likely to be  older
than other employees.      On the other side of the balance sheet, the  size of the sexual
harassment  judgement  is smaller than in torts that create incapacitating harm to the victim.
Even a simple automobile accident may result in medical damage of  hundreds of thousands
of dollars, so that an uninsured defendant is judgement-proof.   A   hostile work
environment, on the other hand, is   less likely to exhaust  a supervisor's ability to pay
damages.   Not only is the damage less than from death or crippling, but because it depends
on personal interaction between harasser and victim   it cannot be so great as when an
employee misuses company resources to dump toxic waste or otherwise damage thousands
of citizens or customers.
Lawsuits are expensive, however, and even for ordinary breach of contract in which
damages are legally available. the  most important incentives are often social norms or self-
help.  A seller who delivers shoddy goods  will often find that the hurt to his reputation is
far more  of a disincentive  than the threat of an action for breach of contract. He may also
                                               
38 Judgement-proofness is a well-known explanation for why some offenses are crimes
instead of torts, and why  crimes are punished with imprisonment or corporal punishment
rather than fines.  See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law,  p. 222 (4
th Ed., Little,
Brown, 1992): "This means that criminal law is primarily designed for the nonaffluent; the
affluent are kept in line by tort law."20
face retaliation from the buyer, to whom the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly grants
the self-help rights of anticipatory repudiation  if breach seems likely and to sale of certain
of the seller's goods if breach has occurred.
39  The same disincentives can be effective for
use against sexual harassment.    An employer's reputation is hurt if he treats his employees
contrary to their expectations, and if he has no resort against a harassed employee who
suddenly quits,  he will likely incur high costs to harassment.
40  These remedies have the
advantage of much lower transaction costs, since lawyers and courts do not have to be
involved-- not just because of the cost of paying legal and court staff, but because the
reputations of innocent parties can suffer when evidence is subpoena'd and made public in
litigation
41    They have the disadvantage that  risks to reputation fail to deter employers
who are near bankruptcy or for other reasons have short time horizons,  that in some cases
no effective self help is available,  and that they will usually fail to compensate the
employee for the harm done.
The second rationale, that harassment by the supervisor  harms the employer,  is also
a matter between two private parties, and so the benefits and costs of  the various corrective
policies  are similar.   The  Restatement of Agency (Second) lays   out   the common law
remedies in   Section  399, "Remedies of Principal".
"A principal whose agent has violated or threatens to violate his duties has an
appropriate remedy for such violation.  Such remedy may be:
 (a)  an action on the contract of service;
  (b)  an action for losses and for the misuse of property;
(c)  an action in equity to enforce the provisions of an express trust undertaken by
the agent;
(d)  an action for restitution, either at law or in equity;
(e)  an action for an accounting;
(f)  an action for an injunction;
(g)  set-off or counterclaim;
                                               
39 Uniform Commercial Code 2-610, Anticipatory Repudiation and  U.C.C. 2-711,  Buyer's
Remedies in General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods.
40 On the advantages of stigma generally, see Eric  Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling
Expectations of Criminality, 39 J L Econ 519 (1996).
41 A prominent example of these costs is the embarassment and perjury into which President
Clinton fell as a result of legitimate discovery in Jones v. Clinton,  990 F. Supp. 657 (1998
E D Ark). (This case was brought under neither Title VII nor Title IX, but rather under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, under which a government agent is liable if he deprives a woman of equal
protection under color of the law.) .  The problem is well put by James Stephen when he
discusses why social norms are superior to law in dealing with vice: "... the expense of the
investigations necessary for the legal punishment of such conduct would be enormous. It
would be necessary to go into an infinite number of delicate and subtle inquiries which
would tear off all privacy from the lives of a large number of persons. These considerations
are, I think, conclusive reasons against treating vice in general as a crime." James Stephen,
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity,  2nd edition (1874) at 15121
(h)  causing the agent to be made party to an action brought by a third person against
the principal;
(i)  self-help;
  (j)  discharge; or
(k)  refusal to pay compensation or rescission of the contract of employment."
Thus, the employer can seek injunctive or monetary relief from  a harassing
supervisor, which have the same advantages and disadvantages as when the employee seeks
such relief from a harassing employer.
42   Just as the employee can  punish  the employer by
hurting his reputation and by quitting suddenly, so the employer can  punish the supervisor
by hurting his reputation and by discharging him suddenly.   Since the employer is a larger
entity than the supervisor, these punishments are likely to be larger relative to his wealth
than when the employee punishes the employer.
43
The third rationale, the  problem of mental externalities requires a different
approach.   If the public shares in the harm from sexual harassment, then   civil suits for
injunctions or money judgements equal to the damage inflicted  will not provide adequate
deterrence.    The employer and employee could come to an agreement that benefited both
but still caused harm to the public in excess of their benefits.  The employee's decision to
sue, if agreement is not reached,  would be based on the employees calculation of a
judgement equal to the private damage, which would be smaller than the public damage,
and some suits useful for social deterrence would not be brought.
44  Moreover, judgement-
                                               
42 Note, too, that if  the supervisor damages the employer by making him liable to the
employee, the supervisor can seek compensation from the supervisor if the origin of the
liability was in the supervisor's breach of duty. Section 401 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency  say that    "An agent is subject to liability for loss caused to the principal by any
breach  of duty," with the comment  at @401 (d) that  "Thus, a servant who, while acting
within the scope of employment, negligently injures a third person, although personally
liable to such person, is also subject to liability to the principal if the principal is thereby
required to pay damages." (We will see below,however, that sexual harassment will
ordinarily not be in the "scope of employment".)
43 The reputation punishment to the supervisor may be larger relative to the supervisor's
wealth  even though it is smaller in absolute size.   The reputation punishment to a large
corporation from a well-publicized employee complaint may be extremely large in dollar
terms precisely because the corporation is so large to begin with. Whether it is the absolute
or relative size of the punishment that is most important  has been much studied. See John
Lott,  Should the Wealthy be Able to `Buy Justice',   95 J. Pol. Econ.    1307-1316 (1987);
David .Friedman, Reflections on Optimal Punishment, or: Should the Rich Pay Higher
Fines?    3  Research in Law and Economics, ed. Richard Zerbe,  185-205 (1981);  David
Friedman,  Should the Characteristics of Victims and Criminals Count? Payne v Tennessee
and Two Views of Efficient Punishment,  34 Boston College L. Rev. .731-769 (1993)..   For
present purposes, we are concerned more with who should pay and how rather than with ho
much.
44 There do exist solutions to the   problem of the plaintiff's incentive to sue--  to grant the
private plaintiff treble damages or punitive damages, for example-- but devising optimal22
proofness of the harasser becomes a much more important problem if the damage is not just
the unpleasantness of the work environment to one person but the offense to  a large number
of members of the public.
There is thus a much stronger case for criminal penalties if the  law's objective is to
correct for mental externalities.  Prosecution is at the discretion of the public prosecutor.
Since his decision to bring cases depends on how they will affect  his  overall record with
the voters rather than on the probability and amount of damages recovered, the decision to
bring suit is decoupled from the penalty inflicted on the harasser.    Since imprisonment is a
possible penalty, the possible judgement-proofness of the harasser does not prevent his
punishment.   The legal process is still costly, but the prosecutor takes   into account not
only  his own costs, but those of the government  court, and directly considers the deterrent
effects, not just the benefits obtainable in the particular case at bar.
B.  The Problem of the Harassing Supervisor
 Suppose criminal penalties are ruled out. . What then should be done? Should the
supervisor be liable?  How should the loss should be split between the  employer and the
employee, if the supervisor is judgment-proof?  The division of losses is  even more
relevant to sexual harassment by fellow servants, who will have less wealth than
supervisors.
45 Should we let losses lie where they fall, or try to reallocate losses among the
victims?
A standard question in the economic analysis of tort law is which party could avoid
the harm at lowest cost.  When an auto strikes a pedestrian, the court must decide whether
to let the loss lie on the pedestrian, to impose it entirely on the driver, or to somehow split
the loss.  To put the loss on the party at "fault" is meaningless without a definition of fault.
One definition is to ask who could have avoided the harm most easily and to say that party,
the least-cost-avoider, is at fault.  Since both parties could have avoided the harm, the court
must look at their relative costs of avoiding harm, not just whether they could have
prevented it.  The pedestrian could have avoided the accident by looking out more carefully,
jumping at an appropriate moment, or by not walking at all.  The driver could have avoided
it by looking out more carefully, swerving, or not driving at all.  Imposing the loss on
whoever could have avoided it at least cost is a simple way to providing more efficient
                                                                                                                                               
rules that fit all situations is difficult.  For one  careful analysis  of this kind of problem, see
A.   Mitchell Polinsky  & Yeon Koo Che,  Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for
Care and Litigation,  22 Rand   J. Econ. 562-570 (1991).
45 This sharing of loss among innocent parties is the major theme in the law of agency as
applied to breach of contract. There, often even a supervisor's wealth is insufficient to pay
for the losses he creates by his irresponsible agreements with third parties. See Eric
Rasmusen, The Economics of Agency Law and Contract Formation, unpublished
manuscript, Indiana University, Dept. of Business Economics and Public Policy, August
1998.23
incentives than simply letting losses lie where they fall.  The question is then whether the
improvement in incentives is worth the cost of using the courts.
This idea can and has been refined in a large literature that has grown up exploring
the effects of negligence, comparative negligence, and strict liability on incentives.
46
Certain problems are clear.  If we impose strict liability or no liability on the driver, that
entirely eliminates either the driver’s or the pedestrian’s incentives for care, and can
actually increase the amount of harm.
47 If we must impose the entire loss on one party or the
other, as is traditional in the common law,
48 we should impose it on the party who could
have avoided the accident at least cost.
49
The same principle can be applied to the harm of sexual harassment.
50 In the
example of Sam and Emily, the employer could perhaps have prevented the harm by taking
care in hiring supervisor Sam, by watching him more carefully, or by disciplining him
before employee Emily quit.  Emily could perhaps have prevented the harm by behaving
differently towards Sam or by notifying the employer of Sam’s behavior.  In determining
liability according to the least-cost-avoider rule, the court would try to fashion a rule that
imposes liability on whichever party could have avoided the harm at least cost.  Sam
himself has the least cost of avoiding harm of any of the three parties, which is why
ordinarily liability for intentional torts lies squarely on the tortfeasor.  But here we are
assuming Sam is unreachable.
                                               
46 See generally Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9  J Leg Stud 1 (1980);
Robert Cooter,  Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal L
Rev. 1 (1985); Richard Landes and Richard Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law
(Harv U Press,1987).
47 If we fail to impose liability for a driver who intentionally hits the pedestrian, or fail to
make the pedestrian's intentional flinging himself in front of the car a defense for the driver,
we will encourage  harmful behavior that could easily be prevented. On strict liability
generally, see Alan Schwartz, The Case Against Strict Liability, 60 Fordham L Rev 819
(1992).
48 An obscure but interesting example to the contrary from Mongolian law is the provision
in the Mongolo-Oirat Regulations of 1640 that  if a third party buys stray cattle from a
finder, the loss is split-- the original owner is entitled to the head and the third party to the
rump. Similar splits were common in other areas of accident law in Mongolia.  Saul
Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser, 16 J Leg
Stud 3, 63 (1987).
49 This is the conventional economic interpretation of what is behind  the famous Hand Rule
of United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F2d 169, 173 (2d Cir 1947).
50 Here,  I part company with Judge Posner, who says, “The provisions of the Second
Restatement of Agency are designed mainly for two types of case neither of which is before
us. The first is the tort committed against a stranger, as where a truck driver employed by
the defendant runs down a pedestrian. The second is the contract between a stranger and an
agent of the defendant.” Ellerth-7th Circuit, 123 F3d at 508 (1997). Judge Posner thinks
torts by fellow servants and supervisors are significantly different; I think the same
principles useful for analyzing them.24
The usefulness of the least-cost-avoider idea is even greater for sexual harassment
than for torts generally because sexual harassment occurs in the context of an underlying
contract.  The aim of imposing liability on the least-cost-avoider is to maximize the sum of
the surplus of all the parties involved.  In the context of most torts, this has the deficiency
that it does not necessarily make all parties better off, since they do not meet each other in
advance and cannot make side payments to balance the inequalities created by the legal
liability rule.  The efficient tort rule might, for example, favor pedestrians at the expense of
drivers, and all we can say is that most people occupy both roles at different times and so
would favor a rule that maximized total surplus.  In harassment, however, any imbalance
the legal rule creates can be adjusted in the underlying contract.  If the legal rule requires
the employer to exert much more effort than the employee to prevent harassment, for
example, bargaining between employer and prospective employee will lead to lower wages
than if the legal rule favored employees.  Since side payments in the form of wage
adjustments will split whatever gain in total surplus is achieved by using the efficient rule,
both employer and employee should favor the efficient rule.
If we are faced with the two alternatives of imposing liability for the employee's
$1,000 loss on the employer or letting losses lie where they fall, it is appropriate to ask who
is the least-cost avoider, employee or employer.
51 If the employer knew about the
harassment and did nothing, as in Oncale, we may conclude that the employer should be
liable for the employee's loss.    Ratification of an  agent's action by a principal makes him
liable for damages from that action, and may even  be evidence that the action was
authorized in the first place.
C.  The Scope of Employment Rule
The common law of agency makes principals liable for the torts of their agents when
the agents are acting on their behalf-- in the "scope of employment".
52    But  when is the
agent acting on behalf of the principal?  Section 228 of the  Restatement (Second) of Agency
defines the "scope of employment" as follows:
                                               
51 These are, of course, not the only two alternatives. The court could use comparative
negligence and base the split on the efforts of each party to avoid the harm. This, however,
has high transactions costs, since every effort and every loss must be precisely estimated,
and both parties will contest the estimate every step of the way.
52 Lord Holt said in Jones v. Hart, K.B. 642 (1698) "If the servants of A. with his cart run
against another cart, wherein is a pipe of wine, overturn the cart and spoil the wine, an
action lieth against A." A’s servant is acting on A’s business, even though he is performing
it incompetently, and so A is liable.  For an economic analysis, see Alan Sykes, The
Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L J 1231 (1984). For an economic view of the
scope of employment rule, see Alan Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An
Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101
Harv. L Rev 563 (1988).25
(1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if:
(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform;
(b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits;
(c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and
(d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of
force is not unexpectable by the master.
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in
kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little
actuated by a purpose to serve the master.
Of particular importance here are the requirements that the servant's conduct be "of
the kind he is employed to perform" and actuated  "by a purpose to serve the master."  The
second of these is amplified in Section 235, which uses the following illustrations:
@ 235 (a) Illustration 3.  P, a railroad company, employs A as a freight brakeman
and instructs him  to eject trespassers from the train.  A permits persons to ride upon
the freight train upon payment to him of a small amount.  He ejects T, one of A's
regular customers, for failure to pay the bribe.  A's act is not within the scope of
employment.
@ 235 (c) Illustration 4.  A is employed to eject trespassers.  A boy of four seeks to
enter the premises.  A could easily prevent the child from so doing by calling to him.
Instead, he shoots at the child and kills him.  This evidence indicates that A
was not actuated by an intent to perform his master's business and hence that
his act was not within the scope of his employment.
53
Because the agent has to be plausibly acting on behalf of the principal, application
of agency law to Title VII sexual harassment has trouble for the courts.  It has been pointed
out that
 Employers should virtually never be liable for sexual harassment if respondeat
superior is the agency principle of choice because such behavior is rarely, if ever,
within the scope of employment under the Restatement's criteria.
54
                                               
53  Illustration 4 is attached to the following comment. "The fact that an act is done in an
outrageous or abnormal manner has value in indicating that the servant is not actuated by an
intent to perform the employer's business.  See Comment b on @ 229 and @ 245.
In such cases, the facts may indicate that the servant is merely using the opportunity
afforded by the circumstances to do the harm.  Hence, unless the principal has violated a
personal duty to the person injured, or unless he becomes liable because of the nature of the
instrumentality entrusted to the servant (see @@ 212-214), he is not liable for such acts."
54 Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principles: A
Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 Vand. L. Rev 1230 (1991). See
also J. Hoult Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 Va  L  Rev
273 (1995).26
One court wrote  with respect to racial harassment,
 "It would be the rare case where .  .  .  harassment against a co-worker could
be thought by the author of the harassment to help the employer's business."
55
Another court has written that
"…confining liability .  .  .  to situations in which a supervisor acted within
the scope of his authority conceivably could lead to the ludicrous result that
employers would become accountable only if they explicitly require or consciously
allow their supervisors to molest women employees."
56
When an agent deliberately takes an action that the principal has forbidden and that
cannot possibly benefit the principal exempting the principal from liability is hardly
ludicrous.  Few employers sacrifice profits in order to put women at the mercy of lecherous
supervisors.  Thus, sexual harassment is “too little actuated by a purpose to serve the
master” to fall within the scope of employment as the Restatement defines it.
As discussed earlier, however, the employer may be willing to allow harassment as a
perk of the supervisor, something which costs the employer by reducing productivity but
helps the employer by allowing him to pay supervisors lower wages.  Then, the harassing
supervisor is indeed acting within the scope of his authority, and harassment by the
supervisor can properly be imputed to the employer.
57   The employer has ratified the
harassment.   And indeed, the common law has made principals liable for the torts of their
                                               
55Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Engine Div., 797 F2d 1417, 1422 (7th Cir 1986, Posner,
J.). Although this is true of harassment, there are many intentional torts which agents do
plausibly think are in the interests of the principal, and so are within the scope of
employment. In Son v. Hartford Ice Cream Co. , 102 Conn. 696, 129 A. 778 (1925),
defendant's truck driver, sent to a shop to collect money, used force and injured the plaintiff.
The trial and appellate courts ruled for the plaintiff, since the agent was on his principal's
business, and was using his force on his behalf, however misguidedly and even though he
was otherwise instructed. Similarly, Judge Learned Hand held that a drunken boatswain
who assaulted a sailor for lying idle in his bunk was acting within the scope of his
employment. Nelson v. American-West African Line, 86 F2d 730 (2
nd Cir 1936).
56Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F2d 141, 151 (DC Cir 1985).
57 How little this point is understood is shown by what even Judge Flaum, who advocates an
expansive view of sexual harassment law, says in his 7
th Circuit opinion in Ellerth, referring
to the Restatement of Agency: “I imagine that subsections (a) and (c) would infrequently be
of analytical value in a sexual harassment case, for presumably employers are not in the
business of harassment, and it is not conceivable that harassment of an employee will serve
the interests of an employer.”  It would help the employer by pleasing the harasser, who
would be happier at his work.27
agents if the principal’s care could easily have prevented the harm— even intentional torts
outside the scope of employment.  Section 317 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts says,
58
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while
acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally
harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of
bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which
the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
       (ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his
servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for
exercising such control.
59
As  Judge Posner wrote (in a railroad tort opinion),
“...plaintiff may prevail in an intentional tort case by showing either that the
intentional tort was committed in furtherance of the employer's objectives or that the
employer was negligent in hiring, supervising, or failing to fire the employee.”
60
 Just what negligent hiring  is  depends, as negligence always does, on the
circumstances, and there often exist state statutes specifically delineating what employers of
people with particularly great opportunities for crime must do.
61 The issue is not whether
                                               
58 See also  § 219(2) of the  Restatement (Second) of Agency:  (2) A master is not subject to
liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless:
 (a) the master intended the conduct or the consequences, or
 (b) the master was negligent or reckless, or
 (c) the conduct violated a non-delegable duty of the master, or
(d) the servant purported to act or to speak on behalf of the principal and there was reliance
upon apparent authority, or he was aided in accomplishing the tort by the existence of the
agency relation."
59 Restatement (Second) of Torts   § 317 (1958).
60Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Railway, 773 F2d 807 (7th Cir 1985),   at 818.
61 In McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947), the City was held
liable for the shooting of two people by a drunken on-duty policeman whom it knew had a
drinking problem. In Easley v. Apollo Detective Agency, 69 Ill. App. 3d 920 (1979), a
detective agency was held liable for attempted sexual assault of an employee after it hired a
security guard, and gave him a pass key to tenants’ apartments, knowing he had  once been
fired for sleeping on the job, had an arrest record for minor crimes, and that a female co-
worker once complained he had "made eyes at her." (This was under a special Illinois
statute imposing liability on detective agencies for employee’s misconduct--  Ill Rev Stat.,
ch. 38, para. 201-10b(10) (1975) (repealed 1984)).  There are also, of course, an abundance28
the tortfeasor is working on behalf of the employer, but whether the employer has carelessly
given him the opportunity to commit the tort.  Such negligence could apply to a customer or
a volunteer who was given access to criminal opportunities just as easily as an employee.
62
In the context of sexual harassment, an employer can do little to avoid it via careful
supervisor selection except to check for rape convictions and read reference letters for lurid
stories.
63 The main scope for negligence would come rather in learning about supervisor
misbehavior and irresponsibly ignoring it, in which case negligence comes to a result very
similar to the agency doctrines of apparent authority and  ratification.
64
The victimized employee also has an important role in preventing and correcting
sexual harassment.  An employee who failed to complain about the hostile environment at
the time, waiting until it was too late for anyone to take corrective action, should not be
compensated.  Indeed,  it is  more  reasonable to  require  that the   employee should be
liable for damages to an employer  who has been hurt by harassment that the employee
could easily have tried to stop  as to require that the employer be liable to the employee for
unauthorized harassment by a  supervisor.  The employer has  been hurt by the necessity of
finding and training a new employee, a cost that could have been avoided if the old one had
complained about the supervisor instead of just quitting.   Neither employer nor employee,
however,  has as much control over an intentional tort as the actual tortfeasor, the
supervisor, and the small increases in care that would result from imposing tort liability on
                                                                                                                                               
of rules requiring employers to hire only qualified workers for jobs with high potential for
non-intentional torts, e.g., driving trucks or airplanes.
62 See, e.g., Mark C. Lear,  Just Perfect for Pedophiles? Charitable Organizations That
Work with Children and Their Duty To Screen Volunteers, 76 Tex. L Rev 143 (1997).
63 Slander law and natural disinclination to write derogatory reference letters means, of
course, that references are likely to be more boring than lurid. As  Judge Coffey points
(Ellerth-7th Circuit, 123 F3d at 541 (1997)), state statutes often bar employers from
reasonable precautions such as checking arrest records in hiring employees;   Wisconsin law
forbids  employers from asking job applicants whether they have  arrest records. Wis. Stat.
Ann. §§ 111.331, 111.32, and 111.335 or from basing an employment decision on  criminal
convictions unless they "substantially relate to the circumstances of the particular job." Wis.
Stat. Ann. § 111.335. Would a rape conviction be relevant to a job in which the applicant
would work with women? The unfortunate employer  won’t know till his case reaches trial.
See, more generally, Walter Olson, The Excuse Factory: How Employment Law is
Paralyzing the American Economy (Free Press, 1997).
64 The Restatement of Agency has extensive discussions of  apparent authority and
ratification.  See Sections  32 to 49 on apparent authority and   82 to 104 on ratification
generally.  These doctrines are  most important in contracts made by agents on behalf of the
principal, since the cost to the third parties of discovering the absence of actual authority
can be too high for it to be efficient to impose that burden on them.  With regard to most
torts,  the question of authority is unimportant, because the victim does not agree to the tort.
With regard to sexual harassment, however,  authority matters because  (a) the tort may be a
perk of the agent, reducing the amount the principal needs to pay him as discussed earlier,
and (b) if the tort is authorized or seems to be authorized,  it is inefficient to require the
victim to learn that complaint to the principal would result in punishment of the agent.29
either of them is unlikely to be worth the transaction costs.   Since we know that creation of
tort liability will lead to litigation costs, we should not create it unless we think the
improvement in incentives is substantial, especially in a context such as employment where
the parties can create liability by contract.  Thus, imposing liability for the sexual
harassment of supervisors on employers is a mistake unless it will clearly improve the
employer’s incentive substantially, while reducing the employee’s incentives no less
substantially.  If it is unclear which party is the least-cost-avoider, the law should let losses
lie where they fall.
Clearly, the supervisor’s incentives are improved   if he becomes personally liable
for an intentional tort such as sexual harassment (unless he is judgement-proof, in which
case there are no court costs either, since he will not be sued).  Equally clearly,  the
supervisor's incentives are diminished  if the employer is made liable, since litigation will
be shifted away from him and towards the employer. 
65  If the employer has ratified the
supervisor’s actions, either explicitly or by obvious acquiescence, the employer’s incentives
are improved if he becomes liable.  Otherwise,  if the employer cannot prevent the
harassment, and is nonetheless made liable for it,  the punishment has  been put on the
wrong party.   More important,  when a person has little influence over whether a tort
occurs, to impose tort liability results in little extra care but in the considerable extra
transaction costs of the legal process.
D.  Other suggested rules
More complicated liability rules than imposing liability on employer, supervisor, or
employee  are possible.  A recent article by Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman contains a
useful classification scheme for liability rules concerned with giving the employer incentive
to investigate and report the intentional torts of its agents.
66 They note that strict liability
may give the employer very weak incentives to investigate because it can uncover evidence
against the employer.
67 A   liability standard  would be duty-based, on the other hand,  if it
                                               
65 Making the owner liable for the intentional torts of his agent makes him
vulnerable to collusive lawsuits. The supervisor could  deliberately harasses the employee
in exchange for a cash payment and freedom from suit, after which the  employee  would
sue the employer, using the supervisor as a   witness  who freely admits to the harassment.
More simply, a supervisor could   takes revenge on  an  employer  who had somehow
offended him  by committing torts for which the employer would be liable.  The  only
drawback  is that the supervisor would be liable to the employer for compensation for the
damages paid to the third party, but in cases where the supervisor was judgement proof  his
ability to commit  intentional torts and shift the  cost to the employer could be quite
effective.
66 Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of
Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 NYU L Rev 687 (1997).
67 The 1997 article is an expanded analysis of this point, which was earlier made in Jennifer
Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Leg Stud 83330
exempts the employer from liability if he undertakes a reasonable amount of investigation.
Mixed regimes of adjusted strict liability and composite liability can ameliorate the perverse
incentives of strict liability. Adjusted strict liability is the same as strict liability except that
it protects the firm from the effect of the firm’s investigative measures.  An example is a
privilege that protects the firm’s internal disciplinary records from discovery.  Composite
liability separates liability for the basic wrong and liability for failure to investigate or
prevent the wrong.  An example is to have a small penalty for the basic wrong but a large
additional penalty for failure to investigate the wrong.
Arlen and Kraakman deals, however, with intentional torts that benefit the employer
and for which the victim’s degree of care is unimportant, such as product adulteration or
illegal dumping of waste.  Without liability the employer would actually encourage the torts
of his agents. If the victim’s care is unimportant strict liability is the least-cost avoider rule.
Sexual harassment by a supervisor, by contrast, does not benefit the employer and can be
avoided by the victim who plays a crucial role by reporting violations.  Despite these
differences, the Arlen-Kraakman analysis is relevant to harassment. A rule that allows
evidence generated by internal disciplinary procedures to be used against the employer or
fails to reduce the employer’s liability in proportion to his efforts will deter efforts he would
otherwise make to discover whether harassment has occurred.  Based on this analysis, it will
be seen that  the Court's rule in Ellerth is perverse.
IV.  The Supreme Court’s Rule in Ellerth
 
The Supreme Court’s Ellerth rule for hostile environment sexual harassment, quoted
at the start of this article, does not  simply put liability on the employer in case of supervisor
harassment, nor does it    fit Arlen and Kraakman’s classification.  It is duty-based liability,
but  rather than the plaintiff's having to show that the defendant was negligent, the
defendant must show that he was not negligent.
The burden of proof is significant.   Think how the Ellerth rule would apply to
automobile accidents.  Under a negligence standard, the plaintiff would have to show that
the defendant was negligent— that he had gone through a red light, for example.  The
plaintiff could not simply provide the court with evidence that his car was damaged by the
defendant.  Under the Ellerth rule, the plaintiff would provide the evidence that the
defendant had damaged his car, and having presented that evidence, he would be done.  The
defendant would have to show that (a) he, himself, had been taking reasonable care when he
drove, and (b) the plaintiff was negligent.  Both points (a) and (b) would be difficult to
prove both because evidence from the time of the accident might be unavailable and even if
it were not, showing that the level of care was a reasonable level could be difficult, given
that an accident did happen.  Note too, that even if the defendant could show that the
plaintiff had negligently driven through a red light, that would not excuse the defendant
from showing that he was driving with care.  Rather, the defendant would have to show that
                                                                                                                                               
(1994). See also David Dana, The Perverse Incentives of Environmental Audit Immunity, 81
Iowa L Rev 969 (1996).31
even though the plaintiff was at fault, the defendant could not have prevented the accident
by reasonable care to correct for the plaintiff’s mistakes.
 When the harm is due to sexual harassment, under a negligence rule, the plaintiff
would have to show that the employer was negligent--- that the employer could have
undertaken to suppress the supervisor’s harassment but did not do so.  An example of this
might be evidence that the employee complained to a superior who failed to investigate.
Under the Ellerth rule, the plaintiff just needs to show that harassment occurred.  The
defendant employer must then show that he took reasonable care to avoid and correct
harassment, and that the plaintiff did not take reasonable care.  If little evidence is available
the employer loses.  If it is not clear what “reasonable” means, then even an employer with
plentiful evidence will have difficulty in showing that his care was reasonable.  In hindsight,
it may be difficult to convince a sympathetic jury that any level of care is reasonable if the
employer’s care failed to work and allowed harassment to occur in a particular instance.
Indeed, to see the difficulties in the Ellerth rule we need only look at Ellerth and
Faragher, the two cases to which it was first applied.   In both, the Supreme Court ruled
that sexual harassment had occurred but that since no tangible employment action such as
firing occurred the employer could raise the defenses of reasonable employer behavior and
unreasonable employee behavior.    
 In Ellerth, even without evidence that Burlington's sexual harassment policy was
faulty, Burlington  must show on remand that it undertook all reasonable steps—though it is
not clear what steps those are—to prevent and correct   sexual harassment. This means that
Ellerth can obtain a settlement from Burlington  even if her case would be weak once the
evidence is assembled.   Ellerth has some chance of winning because of the issue of whether
Burlington’s behavior was reasonable, simply because what is reasonable is so ill-defined.
She also has   a smaller burden of proof and hence smaller legal costs.  Her threat to carry
the case through to trial is therefore credible, and since    Burlington has more to lose by
continuing expenditures on the case than she does, even  if Burlington is more likely than
not to win,  Ellerth is in a good bargaining position in settlement negotations. More
generally, in cases like this, putting the burden on the defendant will, by increasing
prospective defendant legal costs,  make settlements more advantageous to plaintiffs, which
in turn will lead more plaintiffs to file suit, even if their cases are weak.
In  Faragher, the City of Boca Raton did have a formal policy concerning sexual
harassment. Two months before plaintiff Faragher quit, another woman, a former employee,
wrote to the City Personnel Director, who began an investigation that ended in the
disciplining of the two harassing supervisors. 
68  Faragher did not formally complain, but
informally told the third of the supervisors, who advised her that the City did not care. 
69
From this, could a court say as a matter of law that the City had a reasonable policy against
sexual harassment, and that Faragher was unreasonable in not taking advantage of it? Or
                                               
68 Faragher, 118 S Ct at ____(1998).  This other woman was Nancy Ewanchew, the other
plaintiff in Faragher-D.C.
69 Faragher118 S Ct at ____(1998).32
would more factfinding have to occur, to determine whether there were other steps the City
should have taken?     The Court  said:
 While the City would have an opportunity to raise an affirmative defense if
there were any serious prospect of its presenting one, it appears from the record that
any such avenue is closed.  The District Court found that the City had entirely failed
to disseminate its policy against sexual harassment among the beach employees and
that its officials made no attempt to keep track of the conduct of supervisors like
Terry and Silverman.  The record also makes clear that the City's policy did not
include any assurance that the harassing supervisors could be bypassed in registering
complaints.  App.  274.  Under such circumstances, we hold as a matter of law that
the City could not be found to have exercised reasonable care to prevent the
supervisors' harassing conduct.  Unlike the employer of a small workforce, who
might expect that sufficient care to prevent tortious behavior could be exercised
informally, those responsible for city operations could not reasonably have thought
that precautions against hostile environments in any one of many departments in far-
flung locations could be effective without communicating some formal policy
against harassment, with a sensible complaint procedure.
70
This is surprising and shows that lower courts will have trouble administering the
Ellerth  rule. It suggests that whether having a written sexual harassment policy for the kind
of behavior at issue in these cases is not worth the cost of the paper it is written on.  It
would be the exceptional workplace in which an employer would approve of such behavior,
and formal policies are not necessary to state the obvious.  Nor in Faragher is there any
indication that a more cumbersome procedure would be useful.   When a complaint was
made by somebody else to the administrator in charge of personnel matters, the complaint
was handled well.  Nevertheless, though the City already has a “formal policy,” the Court
wants a “sensible complaint procedure,” which it seems would  include  “assurance that the
harassing supervisors could be bypassed in registering complaints.” We are not told how
much assurance is enough.     As Justice  Thomas says in dissent:
  The Court today manufactures a rule that employers are vicariously liable if
supervisors create a sexually hostile work environment, subject to an affirmative
defense that the Court barely attempts to define.  This rule applies even if the
employer has a policy against sexual harassment, the employee knows about that
policy, and the employee never informs anyone in a position of authority about the
supervisor's conduct.  . . . . Although the Court recognizes an affirmative defense--
based solely on its divination of Title VII's gestalt, see ante, at 19--it provides
shockingly little guidance about how employers can actually avoid vicarious
liability.  Instead, it issues only Delphic pronouncements and leaves the dirty work
to the lower courts.
71
                                               
70 Faragher, 118 S Ct at 61,62____(1998).
71 Ellerth-U.S., 118 S Ct. at 44,55___ (1998).33
The Ellerth rule suffers not only from vagueness, but also poor incentives.  Indeed,
the vagueness discussed in the previous paragraphs will exacerbate the incentive problem,
since an unclear rule  weakens the incentives for employer and employer alike to act in
accord with the rule's purpose.  If trying to act in accord with a legal rule might still result in
liability, because the prescription of the rule is unclear, the rule will inevitably have less
influence.   Even where the rule is clear it provides poor incentives.  Making it difficult for
employers to escape liability gives them little incentive to try, particularly in light of the
disincentive to collect information that Arlen and Kraakman discuss.   This is particularly
true of the rule that holds the employer strictly liable for quid pro quo harassment that
results in a tangible employment action such as demotion.
72  Even if (a) the victimized
employee does not report the harm, (b) the employer could not possibly have prevented it
without notice from the employee, and (c) the supervisor’s employment action hurts the
employer more than the employee, the employer is still liable.
73   
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72 Stacey Dansker reports in 1997 that the circuits were split on the issue of strict liability
for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Stacey Dansker, Note: Eliminating Strict Employer
Liability in Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment Cases, 76 Texas L Rev 435, 436.  The Fifth
Circuit affirmed, in an unpublished table decision, a district court ruling that an employer
who took prompt action to correct quid pro quo harassment was not liable, and the Supreme
Court refused certiorari.  Sims v. Brown & Root Industrial Services, 889 F Supp. 920 (WD
La 1995),  78 F3d 581 (5
th Cir 1996) , dert denied, 117 S Ct 68 (1996). For the facts and
procedure in this case, see Jennifer Johnson, Note, Employment Law—Are Employers
Strictly Liable for Supervisor Sexual Harassment in the Fifth Circuit After Sims v. Brown &
Root Industrial Services, Inc. et al., 889 F Supp. 920 (W.D. La. . 1995)? Probably Not
Unless Harassment is Included in Supervisory Job Descriptions, 38 Texas L Rev 965
(1997). The Fifth Circuit opinion was unpublished, though, and Justice Kennedy writes in
Ellerth that “Every Federal Court of Appeals to have considered the question has found
vicarious liability when a discriminatory act results in a tangible employment action.”
Ellerth-U.S., 118 S Ct. at ___ (1998). He then cites Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F3d 1122,
1127 (10
th Cir 1993), which imposes strict liability.  Justice Scalia wrote that the Supreme
Court had declined to grant certiorari on the issue in Ellerth, but quid pro quo liability turns
up as dictum nonetheless--as part of   the Ellerth Rule cited above. .  Eugene Scalia, The
Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment, 21 Harv. J L & Pub Pol 307, 321
(1998). For a defense of strict liability in the context of sexual harassment by supervisors,   
see David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers for Sexual Harassment Committed by Their Supervisors, 81 Cornell L Rev  66
(1995).
73 Strict liability for quid pro quo harassment rule has been accepted with relatively little
debate perhaps because of the analogy to racial discrimination. Racial discrimination
motivated by the supervisor’s bias against an entire race can be systemic, resulting in a
visible pattern of employment actions,   a pattern more easily visible to the employer even
than to outsiders or employees. Employee  complaint is much less important.  In recent
years, suits based on individual mistreatment have become more common; see  John J.
Donohue   & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination
Litigation, 43 Stan. L  Rev  983  (1991).   This is one example of how employer liability for
the employment actions of supervisors arises in more  contexts than just  sexual harassment.34
Incentives for the supervisor and the employee are also poor. The Ellerth rule
reduces the expected costs to supervisors by increasing the cost to employers, whose deeper
pockets will make them the focus of litigation.   Moreover, if employer and supervisor are
joint defendants, the supervisor will benefit from legal expertise provided by the employer,
who might otherwise happily leave him to his own resources.
A. Possible alternatives to the Ellerth rule
What alternative might the Court consider?    One alternative would be for the Court
to define reasonableness. A basis for determining what is reasonable might be to discover
what kind of policies employers have for their employees to report other kinds of supervisor
misbehavior that hurt the employer, such as embezzlement, alcoholism, sleeping on the job,
promoting friends instead of good workers, and so forth.   These would be suitable models
because we could expect employers to take reasonable steps to guard against behavior when
they bear the costs. Since only part of the cost of sexual harassment falls on the company,
the law could require companies to bring their sexual harassment policies up to the level of
their policies for these other offenses.  If employers do not have formal policies for
employee reports of supervisor alcoholism, this suggests that they do not find it cost
effective to establish formal policies.  A similar inference might be drawn regarding sexual
harassment.
Another alternative  would be to treat sexual harassment the same as other
intentional torts, and make the employer liable only when the supervisor is acting within the
scope of employment.  The most important test of whether the supervisor is acting within
the scope of his employment would be if the employer ratified his actions or gave him the
apparent authority by not acting when aware of them.
This would be very similar to the standard of  “deliberate indifference,”  which is
similar to criminal recklessness and  has been applied to decide whether a  prison  is  liable
for the actions of one prisoner against another.   As Justice Souter  wrote in Farmer vs.
Brennan:
                                                                                                                                               
For a broad  view, see Rebecca  White, Vicarious and Personal Liability for Employment
Discrimination, 30 Ga  L  Rev 509 (1996).
74 xxx I added the racial discrimination footnote in response to the reviewer's
comments. I've kept it in, since if the reviewer thought it was important, perhaps other
readers will too, even tho I agree with you that discussing race diesrimination is distracting.
I don't know that your footnote discussions of qpq harassment and racial
discrimination are helpful because you don't tie them into your analysis.  Should the
type of discrimination make a difference regarding the nature of the liability?35
We hold . . . that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could  be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.
75
Judge Posner has suggested that this standard be applied to Title IX sexual
harassment cases  involving harassment of one  high school student by another:
eliberate indifference by the school in a case of one student sexually
harassing another would mean that the school (1) actually knew of (2) hostile or
offensive conduct likely to interfere with the victim's education, and (3) deliberately
did nothing, or took steps that it knew would be ineffectual, to protect the victim, (4)
without excuse (for it might be difficult or even impossible to take effective
measures).
76
Requiring that an employer actually knew of supervisor sexual harassment and
could reasonably have responded yet did not do so would give the employee an incentive to
provide notice, and would give the employer incentive to act on this notice.   Retaining
liability of the supervisor would, together with the threat of punishment by the employer,
still give him incentive to refrain from harassment.  Vexing questions—but inevitable ones
if we are to use the law to control an evil--  would remain of what constitutes sexual
harassment and what constitutes excuse, but  by putting the burden of proof  on the plaintiff,
litigation would be kept to a minimum, and used only where the employer clearly could
have avoided the harm at low cost.
B.  The Problem of Bureaucratization
The standard of ratification or deliberate indifference discussed above avoids
another problem which may be exacerbated  by both the appellate and Supreme Court.  If
by reasonable care we mean the efficient level of care, or industry practice, or what
common sense dictates, reasonable care may mean no explicit care at all.  Consider the
analogy to the problem of supervisors who demand kickbacks from employee’s wages,
using threats of firing them.  What is the reasonable level of care for the employer to deter
this kind of behavior? Everyone already knows that it is wrong, and that the employer
                                               
75 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
76 Jane Doe et al. v. University of Illinois, 138 F2d 653, Lexis no. 59 (7
th Cir 1998).  Judge
Posner wrote this in dissent to a denial of en banc hearing of this case. He also distinguished
this Title IX education case from Title VII cases such as Ellerth: “The analogy to Title VII
is deceptive, since Title VII regulates the behavior of adults in the workplace rather than the
inevitably unruly behavior of adolescents.” (at Lexis no. 57). (Implicit is that a high school
is more like a federal prison than like a workplace.)36
would disapprove if he knew of it, so promulgation of an anti-kickback policy would incur a
useless cost.  Promulgation might backfire, in fact, because, having seen express
disapproval of only this kind of obviously bad behavior, supervisors might conclude that
other kinds of graft are allowed.  Nor is it cost-effective for the employer to monitor the
bank accounts of all its employees or send out complaint forms weekly in order to detect the
one supervisor in a thousand who may be trying to extort kickbacks.  The reasonable level
of care by the employer to prevent kickbacks is to do nothing until the issue arises, but to
listen to employee complaints and investigate if appropriate.  But would this seem
reasonable to a judge or jury after the fact? Looking not at 999 honest supervisors and 1
dishonest one, but at only the dishonest one, it is easy to fall into the trap of thinking that it
is reasonable to monitor the supervisor closely.
77 The same argument can be applied to
many other forms of supervisor misbehavior. Although the employer could reproduce the
entire U.S.  Code and state statutes in a company policy for supervisor behavior, it is more
reasonable to do nothing and trust that supervisors know the company does not approve of
illegal behavior.  Similarly, the reasonable level of employer care to prevent and correct
sexual harassment may be zero.  But whether a jury will accept that is another matter,
especially when the plaintiff is a sympathetic and beautiful woman, the behavior alleged is
grossly immoral, and the defendant is a large corporation.
Yet another problem exists, however, in the kind of company policies that the Court
is encouraging.  Consider the following part of the Ellerth rule:
While proof that an employer had promulgated an anti-harassment policy
with a complaint procedure is not necessary in every instance as a matter of law, the
need for a stated policy suitable to the employment circumstances may appropriately
be addressed in any case when litigating the first element of the defense.  And while
proof that an employee failed to fulfill the corresponding obligation of reasonable
care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable failure to use any
complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the
defense.
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The Court suggests that the employer can plead as partial defenses (a) the existence
of a formal policy against sexual harassment, with grievance procedures, and (b) the failure
of the employee to use the grievance procedure.  Employers therefore have the incentive to
ask their legal staffs to prepare comprehensive and lengthy grievance procedures on sexual
harassment.  This would impede the company in disciplining supervisors for sexual
harassment, thereby reducing the company's efficiency, in order to reduce the threat of
lawsuits.
79
                                               
77 Psychologists refer to our tendency to rely unduly on memorable rather than typical
occurences as "the availability bias". See pp. 92-102 of Robin Dawes, Rational Choice in an
Uncertain World, (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich,1988) for an overview and references.
78 Ellerth-U.S., 118 S Ct. at  42___ (1998).
79 University procedures regarding misgrading and cheating may provide a model.  I have
taught at UCLA and at Indiana University. Both have highly formalized and time-37
Defensive legalism is also a problem because of the incentives of in-house legal
staffs.  Their motive is to protect the company from litigation, since they will be blamed for
not providing enough warning, but they will ignore the adverse efficiency effects.  They
will advise extraordinary caution, and try to document their advice so they can prove later
that the legal staff are not to blame for the lawsuits that occur.
80
The problem of defensive legalism is even more apparent in the lower courts, which
are perhaps more used to dealing with the details of implementation of new social policies.
Consider the following excerpts from two of the most divergent 7
th Circuit opinions in
Ellerth.  Judge Posner writes:
  And since everyone knows by now that sexual harassment is a
common problem in the American workplace, the employer ought in
addition to take, in advance of specific cases of harassment, preventive
measures against it, as by adopting and announcing a policy against sexual
harassment and creating a discreet and convenient machinery by means of
which victims can obtain relief without exposing themselves to retaliation.
These are the responsibilities that a negligence standard imposes.
81
Judge Flaum says:
Pursuant to a negligence standard for supervisory harassment, we
would presumably require a posted anti-sexual harassment policy, a
grievance procedure that allows a complainant to circumvent the supervisory
                                                                                                                                               
consuming procedures for dealing with student complaints of professorial misconduct in
grading and with professor complaints about student cheating.  Professors complain of these
procedures, but we do not seem to realize that although they can consume considerable
faculty time, they  make complaint so difficult that the misgrading professor can hardly be
punished. . Indeed,  I was told by one professor at a state university that the most effective
way to deal with cheating was to avoid the formal procedure for punishing the student and
simply to give him an F on the final, which would put the procedural  burden  on the
student. From the university’s point of view, the objective may be to derail troublesome
complaints about both cheating and misgrading.
80 This, in turn, may create evidence that imperils the employer in subsequent litigation This
is indicated by a September 15, 1998 memo on Indiana University’s new sexual harassment.
Its Appendix A includes a series of examples such as "In the hospital hallway, a male doctor
and a male student health care professional once again discuss the physical attractiveness of
a female patient. A female student health care professional feels embarassed and excluded
by the conversation. When she expresses her feelings of discomfort, she is told there is not
harm intended and that she needs to "grow up" if she wants to be successful on this clinical
rotation."  Our legal staff can now say they have warned the employees, but their expansive
definition of sexual harassment will make it difficult for them to defend the university
when, inevitably, violations occur.
81 Posner, Ellerth-7th Circuit, 123 F3d at 511 (1997).38
chain of command, and prompt remedial action.  . . . While posted policies
and grievance procedures are important, I believe that the remedial goals of
Title VII demand more.  Companies' efforts to deal with sexual harassment
should be systemic and proactive, rather than discrete and reactive.  We
know that companies can implement grievance procedures and discipline
wayward employees; but we also know that companies can hire, train, and
promote employees with an eye toward preventing undesirable behavior.  In
the abstract, a negligence standard conceivably could account for a
company's systemic efforts to promote a workplace free of sexual
harassment.  Employers who had not done enough to reduce the likelihood of
harassment throughout the workplace would be found negligent, even if they
had no notice that a specific employee was a harasser.
82
A wide spectrum of judges, it seems, would look coldly on a company that did not
have a formal grievance procedure for sexual harassment although the behavior is widely
known to be illegal and even more widely considered immoral.  Companies must have
special policies for sexual harassment that they do not have for other kinds of complaints
about supervisor or co-worker misbehavior.
83
Thus, the end result of the Supreme Court's decision may be both more sexual
harassment and less corporate efficiency, the only winners being personnel officers and
lawyers.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
  I have tried in this article to give  a  view of sexual harassment law based on
objectives and incentives.  This view looks  at   results one might expect from  different
laws rather than at their stated intents.    The current law   cannot be justified as promoting
equality between the sexes, protecting  employees against employers, or protecting
employers against supervisors, except to the extent that it allows employees redress against
breach of contract by employers who  provide worse working conditions than expected or
employers and employees redress against supervisors who take advantage of their position
to engage in unauthorized harassment.  Even then, it is open to doubt whether the incentive
benefits of civil suits are worth the legal costs.  A third objective is  the elimination of
mental externalities under which members of the general public suffer disutility when
employees are harassed or otherwise required to endure mistreatment with a sexual element.
                                               
82 Flaum, Ellerth-7th Circuit, 123 F3d at 498 (1997).
83 Special procedures might avoid retaliation by the supervisor. However, the employee
does not need much imagination to see that complaining to the supervisor's boss, as required
under formal procedures, might help. This may be an argument for using some outside
regulatory or police agency to detect and punish sexual harassment, since outsiders have
few incentives to betray confidences.39
This objective is quite reasonable from an efficiency viewpoint, and has real-world
plausibility, since many members of the public do indeed seem highly offended by   sexual
harassment, even, in fact, if the victimized employee were to be amply compensated
monetarily.   Criminal penalties might well be a better instrument to use to  achieve this
objective, however, and legislatures should consider replacing our present system of private
enforcement.
    The courts' attention has been most occupied with  issues  of allocating liability to
employers when supervisors engage in unauthorized harassment.   Under the common law
of agency employers have not been punished for intentional torts by their agents which went
against the employers' interests.  This is consistent with the policy of punishing the least-
cost avoider of harm.  The least-cost avoider is whoever perpetrates the harassment-- the
supervisor, if there is one, or the employer, if it is a smaller organization.  If the perpetrator
is unavailable, then we face the harder question of how to allocate the loss between the
employer and the employee.   In the absence of information acquisition costs, we would
simply put the loss on the least-cost-avoider, whichever party that might be.   In practice, a
good rule would be to put the loss on an employee who does not notify the employer that
harassment is occurring, or on the employer if the employee shows that harassment is
occurring.   In between is a murkier region in which the employee complains, but without
clear evidence of supervisor harassment.  Letting  losses lie where they  fall in such cases
would at least  avoid  the high costs of litigation and defensive administration of businesses.
The Supreme Court's rule in Ellerth, however,  leaves the question of liability unclear, and
by shifting the burden of proof  on the defendant to show lack of negligence, without
defining negligence,  it encourages litigation and inefficient defensive behavior  with little
likelihood of significantly reducing the amount of actual harassment that occurs.